SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN LIBERIA: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL) DRAWDOWN

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

EDDIE P. LAMPTEY, CAPTAIN, LIBERIAN ARMY
BBA, African Methodist Episcopal University, Monrovia, Liberia, 2007

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2017

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. United States Fair Use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the use of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into the manuscript. This author may be protected by more restrictions in their home countries, in which case further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	**2. REPORT TYPE**	**3. DATES COVERED** *(From - To)*
9-06-2017	Master's Thesis	AUG 2016 – JUN 2017

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Progress and Challenges Ahead of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Drawdown.

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)
Captain Eddie P. Lamptey

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
As the UNMIL drawdown nears to an end in Liberia and the security affairs are turned over to the Government of Liberia (GoL) and the security sector, there are major gaps and challenges that need to be addressed before the drawdown is completed. The United Nations mandate and the Comprehensive Peace Accord focus mostly on the political and security aspects with less emphasis on economy, information, social, and infrastructure. While these aspects still need to be addressed, major partners, including international partners, major donors, and the GoL, need to combine more effort in solving these gaps and challenges to enable a conducive atmosphere for the security sector to operate effectively in Liberia. The security sector in Liberia needs sufficient resources and adequate budget allocation to fully assume the role and responsibilities of UNMIL, notwithstanding the GoL and its international partner's needs to also address aspects that affect the progress of the security sector reform program.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), ECOMOG, ECOWAS, Security Sector Reform

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**	**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**	**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
a. REPORT	**b. ABSTRACT**	**c. THIS PAGE**			**19b. PHONE NUMBER** *(include area code)*
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	69	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Captain Eddie P. Lamptey

Thesis Title: Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Progress and Challenges Ahead of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Drawdown

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Daniel C. Honken, M.S.

_____, Member
Phillip Pattee, Ph.D.

_____, Member
R. Wendell Stevens, M.A.

Accepted this 9th day of June 2017 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Prisco R. Hernandez, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN LIBERIA: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL) DRAWDOWN, by Captain Eddie P. Lamptey, 69 pages.

As the UNMIL drawdown nears to an end in Liberia and the security affairs are turned over to the Government of Liberia (GoL) and the security sector, there are major gaps and challenges that need to be addressed before the drawdown is completed. The United Nations mandate and the Comprehensive Peace Accord focus mostly on the political and security aspects with less emphasis on economy, information, social, and infrastructure. While these aspects still need to be addressed, major partners, including international partners, major donors, and the GoL, need to combine more effort in solving these gaps and challenges to enable a conducive atmosphere for the security sector to operate effectively in Liberia. The security sector in Liberia needs sufficient resources and adequate budget allocation to fully assume the role and responsibilities of UNMIL, notwithstanding the GoL and its international partner's needs to also address aspects that affect the progress of the security sector reform program.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

All praises be to God with whom all things are possible. This year in Fort Leavenworth will surely remain one of the best years, not only of my life, but of all the students who have endured to the end. I am grateful to the Armed Forces of Liberia for sending me here to acquire this tremendous educational and professional experience. I am also grateful to the United States Army Command and General Staff College for the opportunity that facilitated this study.

My sincere gratitude goes to the members of my committee, Mr. Daniel C. Honken, Dr. Phillip Pattee, and Mr. R. Wendell Stevens for their patience and guidance. My special thanks go to Dr. Pattee for his commitment and guidance throughout this research. His meticulous proofreading of my drafts contributed immensely to the successful completion of the project. I am extremely grateful to my Staff Group Advisor, LTC Benjamin Croom, for his selfless support and Mr. Daniel C. Honken who inspired the topic of this research.

Most importantly, I want to thank my dear wife, Mrs. Ramatu Ayisha Lamptey, and my kids, Yasmine Faith Korshe Lamptey and Eddie Papie Lamptey Jr. for their patience, tolerance, love, and encouragement throughout this long and challenging process. Thank you and may God bless you all.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE iii

ABSTRACT iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v

TABLE OF CONTENTS vi

ACRONYMS viii

ILLUSTRATIONS ix

TABLES x

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1

Background to the Study 1
Brief History of Liberia Civil War 2
Statement of the Problem 7
Objective of the Study 8
Primary Research Question 9
Secondary Research Questions 9
Definition of Key Terms 9
Scope and Limitations 11
Chapter Summary 11

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 13

Chapter Introduction 13
Origin and Concept of Post-War SSR 13
Concepts of SSR in Different Prospective 14
Liberia SSR 16
Chapter Summary 27

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 28

Methodology 28
Step 1: Current State of Affairs 28
Step 2: Desired State 29
Step 3: Frame of the Problem 30
Step 4: Approach to Solving the Problem 30
Drawing of Conclusions and Recommendation 30

Chapter Summary 31

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS 32

Chapter Introduction 32
Frame 1: The Current Security Situation in Liberia 33
Political 33
Military 35
Economic 36
Social....38
Information 38
Infrastructure....39
Frame 2: Desired End-State (SSR, UN, CPA)....41
Political 42
Military 42
Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure....44
Frame 3: Framing the Problem 45
Drop in Donor Spending for SSR Program 45
Inability of GoL to Finance the SSR Program....46
Time Constraint for the Effectiveness of the SSR Program 47
Frame 4: An Approach to Solve the Problem....48
Political LOE 48
Economic LOE....48
Social and Infrastructure LOE 49
Chapter Summary 50

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS....52

Chapter Introduction 52
Conclusions....52
Recommendations for Decision Makers....54
Recommendations for Future Research....54
Parting Thoughts....55

BIBLIOGRAPHY....56

ACRONYMS

ADM	Army Design Methodology
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
CDDRR	Cantonment, Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operation
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Military Observation Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GoL	Government of Liberia
LNP	Liberian National Police
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
US	United States

ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

Figure 1. Diagram showing the Invasion by NPFL from the Côte d'Ivoire 3

Figure 2. Diagram showing the Invasion of LURD from Guinea.....4

Figure 3. Map of Liberia Showing UNMIL Deployment 6

Figure 4. Conceptual Framework.....31

Figure 5. Operational Approach.....50

TABLES

Page

Table 1 Summary of the Current State of Liberia.....41

Table 2 Summary of the Desired End State of Liberia.....45

Table 3 Summary of the Problem 47

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

The unique history of Liberia started in the 1800s when freed black slaves from the United States settled on coastal land of West Africa, which is now called the Republic of Liberia. According to history, those freed slaves were accepted by the indigenous inhabitants and went on to share that beautiful land. A change occurred in 1980 after years of domination (1847-1980) by the freed slaves, referred to as Americo-Liberians. Samuel Doe, a master sergeant of the AFL, led a *coup d'état*, which resulted in the assassination of then President William R. Tolbert.[1] After the *coup*, thirteen of Tolbert's cabinet members were charged with corruption, subjected to a military tribunal court, and executed. Doe was from the Krahn ethnic group of the southeastern region of Liberia, known as the Grand Gebeh, and was a fearful military dictator. Due to pressure from international partners to return the country to civilian rule, an election was conducted in 1985. According to reports, Doe, who was elected president, rigged the election. After his victory, Doe's former commanding general, Thomas Quiwonkpa, of the Gio ethnic tribe from Nimba County, attempted a *coup* that failed. Doe eliminated all those who were part of the attempted *coup*, and massacred thousands of the Gio ethnic group. In retaliation, Doe then used only men from his own ethnic group for security to maintain his power. Samuel Doe's government was inexperienced and rampant with corruption. Due to

[1] Jemilatu Abdulai, "Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Challenges and Lessons Learned," Academia, 2011, 4-5, accessed 13 October 2016, https://www.academia.edu/6245262/Security_Sector_Reform_in_Liberia_Challenges_and_Lessons_Learned.

ineffective governance, high poverty, insecurity, and the persecution of opposition leaders and peaceful civilians, they had created a nation on the verge of crisis.[2]

Brief History of Liberia Civil War

During the early morning of 24 December 1989, Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invaded Liberia from the neighboring country of Cote d'Ivoire through Nimba County. Taylor, backed by tribesmen from Nimba County, Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, and Burkina Faso, was able to seize 85 percent of the country from Doe and his troops. In September of 1990, a breakaway faction from Taylor's NPLF, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), was able to advance to Monrovia, and later found and killed Doe. After the death of Samuel Doe, several different rebel factions began fighting each other to gain control of territory and natural resources (gold, diamond, iron ore, and timber) to fund their push to control Liberia. As fighting continued in the country, other factions emerged including the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), Liberia Peace Council (LPC), and United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) to join the fight against Taylor's NPFL. MODEL, which was mostly made up of kinsmen of Doe's Krahn tribe, made significant gains fighting Taylor's group, which made them a key force in the country. Figure 1 illustrates the NPFL entry into Liberia.

[2] Arthur Kulah, *Liberia Will Rise Again: Reflections on the Liberian Civil Crisis* **(**Nashville TN: Abingdon Press**,** 1999).

Figure 1. Diagram showing the Invasion by NPFL from the Côte d'Ivoire

Source: Global Security, "Liberia," accessed 14 October 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/liberia/images/liberia_pol96-ed.gif.

As fighting raged among rebel factions, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent a peacekeeping group Economic Community of West African States Military Observation Group (ECOMOG) to restore peace and stability in the war-ravaged nation.[3] Even with the complex nature of the conflict, ECOMOG was able to negotiate with the rebel factions to achieve a ceasefire and peace agreement. In

[3] Global Security, "Liberia – First Civil War – 1989-1996," last modified 11 July 2011, accessed 17 September 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liberia-1989.htm.

1997, post-war presidential elections were held in Liberia. The outcome of the election was in favor of Charles Taylor, leader of the NPFL who won with an overwhelming victory. After the presidential election and with Taylor in power, ECOMOG left Liberia. Peace under Taylor's regime was short lived, by 1999, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) invaded Liberia from the northern part of Lofa County. Figure 2 illustrates the LURD entry into Liberia. By 2003, with mounting pressure from LURD, international partners, international sanctions, and the arrest warrant issued by the UN-backed Special Court in Sierra Leone accusing Taylor of crimes against humanity, Taylor fled Liberia into exile in Nigeria.

Figure 2. Diagram showing the Invasion of LURD from Guinea

Source: Global Security, "Liberia," accessed 14 October 2016 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/liberia/images/liberia_pol96-ed.gif.

The Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), which was signed earlier by warring factions, did not hold and renewed fighting broke out. On 11 September 2003, the UN Secretary-General submitted an update to the Security Council on the rapidly deteriorating situation in Liberia, and recommended that the UN assist in implementing the mandates of the CPA. In 2003 mid-October, the United Nations (UN) deployed a peacekeeping force to Liberia in support of the Security Council resolution 1509 (2003). Subsequently, all the warring factions agreed to the signing of the August 2003 CPA. The UN intervention and contribution to the peace process and peace building was the turning point in the stability of the country after a devastating fifteen years of civil conflict. To maintain and monitor the peace, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) deployed over 15,000 troops across the country.

This peacekeeping force was comprised of military observers (250), staff officers (160), approximately 875 UN police officers, and 120 officers added to five armed formed units, and several civilian component and support teams.[4] Figure 3 illustrates the UNMIL Deployment of forces as of November 2014.

[4] United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), "Background," 13 April 2013, accessed 25 September 2016, http://unmil.unmissions.org/background.

Figure 3. Map of Liberia Showing UNMIL Deployment

Source: United Nations, Department of Field, Support Cartographic Section, "Map No. 4211 Rev. 38 United Nations," April 2015, accessed 15 October 2016, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/unmil_apr15.pdf.

In 2005, UNMIL established the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) program; about 107,000 combatants were processed. This program was designed to target a wide variety of combatants, with special emphasis placed on child soldiers. With these unfolding issues, and with the assistance of the United States Government and other donors, the process of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) program was launched. After the presidential election in 2005 that brought Ellen Johnson Sirleaf into office, President Sirleaf rapidly initiated efforts to foster national reconciliation, rebuild national unity, and restructure the security sector. During this period, public

security was threatened by violent political faction rivalries, criminal acts, often by ex-combatants, which became a major issue.[5]

The CPA, Article VII, stated the AFL must be restructured with a new command structure and requested the United States of America play a lead role in organizing the restructuring program. Article VIII of the CPA also directed the restructuring of the Liberian National Police (LNP) and security services by United Nations Civil Police (UNCIVPOL) components and international agencies to develop and implement a training program.[6] Although there have been many constraints facing the reform effort in terms of budget allocation and equipment, security sectors continue to execute their constitutional duties to safeguard the country. With the extension of the UNMIL mandate continuously in question and Liberia's stability and economy dependent on security, a major question to be debated and addressed by all Liberians is whether the "security sector is prepared to take over the responsibilities of security as UNMIL draws down?"

Statement of the Problem

The Accra CPA of 18 August 2003 laid down a framework for the establishment of a new Liberia security sector. All major factions and key political actors were signatories to the agreement, and this became the framework for peace in Liberia. Both rebel factions, the LURD and MODEL, alluded to the fact there should be a full

[5] Nicolas Cook, Report no. RL33185, *Liberia's Post-War Recovery: Key Issues and Developments* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 5-9, accessed 25 September 2016, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33185.pdf.

[6] United States Institute of Peace, "Comprehensive Peace Agreement," 18 August 2003, accessed 15 February 2017, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf.

restructuring of the security sector to remain neutral in a quest for long lasting peace. These reforms started in 2005 and are ongoing. After the deployment of UNMIL in 2005, stability and peace finally took hold, and Liberians hoped it would continue, especially after the suffering caused by a fifteen year civil war.

After over thirteen years of peacekeeping and peace building, the time has arrived for the UN to turn over security affairs to Liberia's reformed security sector (Army, Police, Immigration, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and National Security Agency (NSA)). However, the question that concerns Liberians, "Is the Security Sector prepared to fully resume the responsibilities after UNMIL drawdown?"

Objective of the Study

The general objective of the study is to make a critical evaluation of the reform of the security sector in Liberia in an attempt to measure the progress and challenges ahead of the UNMIL drawdown.

The specific objectives are:

1. Review of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord on the Security Sector Reform of Liberia
2. Evaluate the role of UNMIL in the implementing the Comprehensive Peace Accord.
3. Determine any shortfalls in the security sector, and how they can be address for a peaceful Liberia.
4. Establish how the people in Liberia are reacting to the announcement of UNMIL drawdown.

Primary Research Question

What is the most important thing that the security sector needs to do to maintain peace and stability after UNMIL drawdown?

Secondary Research Questions

In order to answer the primary research question, there are a number of secondary questions that must be answered. These are:

1. What is the UNMIL framework and time line for drawdown?
2. What is the current status of the security sector in Liberia?
3. What are the shortfalls of the security sector in Liberia?
4. Which of the important shortfalls is more significant?
5. What can be done to fill these shortfalls?

Definition of Key Terms

Conflict: "Conflict is present when two or more parties perceive their interests are incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or pursue their interests through actions that damage the other parties. These parties may be individuals, small or large groups, and countries."[7]

[7] Samuel G. Amoo, *The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis and Future Perspectives* (Fairfax VA: Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 1992).

Observer: "A state, national organization, regional organization, or non-governmental organization that is not a member of the UN but participates in its debates. Observers can vote on procedural matters but not substantive matters."[8]

Security Sector Reform: Security Sector Reform is a "set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that are undertaken by a series of stakeholders to improve the way a state or governing body provides safety, security, and justice to its civilian population within the context of rule of law."[9] The UN defines security sector reform as, "a core element of multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding, essential for addressing the roots of conflict and building the foundations of long-term peace and development"[10] The African Union policy framework defines SSR as "a process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people. This policy takes note that 'Security Sector Reform' is sometimes expressed as security sector governance,

[8] United Nations, "Security Sector Reform: UN Peacekeeping," 2012, accessed 4 May 2017, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/security.shtml.

[9] Sarah Meharg and Aleisha Arnusch, *Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2010), 3.

[10] United Nations, "Security Sector Reform: UN Peacekeeping," 2012, accessed 4 May 2017, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/security.shtml.

security sector transformation, security sector development, security sector review as well as security and justice reform."[11]

Scope and Limitations

This study is limited in the following manner. First, the study is limited in scope to present the challenges of the SSR in the wake of UNMIL drawdown. This causes the study to focus on the problem and limits it to one, detailed study in evaluating, and finding solutions to those challenges. Second, the research in this study is limited to open source information. This causes the study to potentially exclude some important details on concepts and events that occurred. This research will not provide the final solution to SSR in Liberia, but provide a discourse that can possibly improve the concepts discussed. The reader is challenged to conduct further research to discuss other key factor that have tested the progress of the SSR. The delimitations used in this study are determined by a desire to gain an understanding of the SSR, and implementation of United Nations Security Council mandate and the CPA, and how they can maintain long lasting peace and stability. To better articulate the examination of the SSR program in Liberia, the use of the Army Design Methodology (ADM) was applied.

Chapter Summary

This chapter briefly reviews the history of Liberia from the settling of freed slaves in West Africa to the devastating period of civil conflict. It specifically discussed the

[11] African Union, "Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform," African Union Commission Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2006, 6, accessed 4 May 2017, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-policy-framework-on-security-sector-reform-ae-ssr.pdf.

different crises that engulfed the West African nation for over fifteen years from 1989 to 2003. With help from ECOWAS and UN peacekeepers, Liberia is now peaceful and enjoying a period of stability. Nevertheless, problems still exist within the security sector, especially within the planned drawdown of UNMIL and the upcoming presidential elections.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter Introduction

The purpose of this literature review is to reveal scholarly observations about the SSR in Liberia. It will support substantiating evidence that will allow critical analogies with existing literature to find and establish facts relevant to this research work.

Although Liberia has experienced security challenges over the years, the following literature available will assist with details about its SSR. As conflicts and the means of solving them continue to exist around the world, most scholars have not really focused on or written about the SSR of various nations, illustrating how conflict nations employ strategies in achieving success in their security sector. The origin and concept of SSR will also be discussed in this chapter. This chapter will also discuss how other researchers amplified their views about the SSR, peace building, and the transition to governments and other security apparatus.

Origin and Concept of Post-War SSR

The origin and concept of post-war SSR came into being in 1998 during a meeting at a conference held by the honorable, Clare Short, the Ministerial Head of the British Department for International Development. The introduction of the SSR concept also considered many factors, which includes the building of a democratic security institutions and a sustainable security sector. Although the diverse origins of the concept of security sector reform proved to be a burden, the concept was expected to cover a multitude of issues, activities, and policies.

Since Short's speech, failing, weak, and fragile nations emerging from conflict have utilized SSR concepts. Key contributing donors maintain that assistance must flow into safe locations, and necessary security players must be in place to ensure successful and peaceful implementation of development support.[12]

Concepts of SSR in Different Prospective

According to Dylan Hendrickson, the SSR concept over the years has been increasingly employed as an instrument to study mainly the social and security methods in conflict countries. He also stated that security sector reform usually serves as a momentous source of the pace, course, and analysis of social reform. Although, the term has no widely accepted definition, "Security Sector Reform" generally signifies the changes in how security analyze, think, and practice within a specific state framework. He also mentions that the focus of SSR has increasingly been removed from military risks and threats to those of nonmilitary in nature. This includes methodical and systemic de-politicization and de-ideologization of the army, police, and other security services. The disbanding and disarming of various military and paramilitary formation is necessary for peace and stability. Additionally, the concept of SSR indirectly results from the anthropocentric evolution of security, personnel, and the purpose and standards of the

[12] Michael Brzoska, *Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform: Occasional Paper No. 4* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force, 2003).

society and country. Demilitarized security perceptions and practices start within the above structure.[13]

According to Fluri and Hadžić, the sole obligation of a nation is to be able to provide a conducive atmosphere where security for its people will be paramount. Those organizations and security institutions function as the major implementing arm for providing security for people who reside in this state. The authors stated that security sector expands the range of security from its original focus on the armed forces and other security agencies to include public security, or the safety of the individual from threats and violence. They also stated that the concept of security sector reform directly derived from the anthropocentric evolution of views on security, which cited citizens as its major focus and made them the purpose and standard of the society and state.[14]

According to Michael Brzoska, SSR has its origin in the development of donor debate, where there has been ongoing discussion among different groups of theoreticians on how to best approach and implement development assistance. The author stated that the term, "security sector reform," specifically relates to economic and social development, and attracts institutions that are involved in policy growth. He concluded that a common vision of the security sector can advance human improvement, realize destitution diminishment, and permit individuals, including needy individuals, to extend their choices

[13] Dylan Hendrickson, *A Review of Security Sector Reform* (London: Kings College, University of London Strand, September 1999), 11-18.

[14] Philipp Fluri and Miroslav Hadžić, ed., *Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform* (Belgrade: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004), 14, accessed 17 October 2016, http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Sourcebook-on-Security-Sector-Reform.

in life. He concluded that suggestions were provided on how to develop the concept of the SSR, in respect to others concepts used in the development and development donor practice.[15]

Liberia SSR

As per Ibrahim Al-Bakriyei, the security sector in Liberia has significantly improved over the pre-war inadequate and politicized security foundations that were utilized to terrorize the people and exploit the power invested in them as security authorities. He discussed the huge improvement that has been made through the preparation and retraining of officers of the AFL, LNP, Immigration, Correction, and other security organizations. He mentions that the obligations for training and preparing the security sector after it is turned over from the international committee will be shouldered by the Government of Liberia (GoL). He discussed the requirements for the GOL to prepare, train, and deploy more police personnel around the nation, which is the basis to maintaining the trustworthiness of the SSR program and national security. He also stated that the SSR program in Liberia is the same as many other post-conflict administrations, in that it confronts the difficulties ranging from lack of resources and constrained human resources ability to create and maintain the program. He stated that these are the strategic difficulties in the release of staff obligations, and are further exacerbated by the level of underdevelopment of nations due to its conflicts.[16]

---

[15] Ibid., 3.

[16] Ibrahim Al-Bakri Nyei, "Post-War Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Development and Challenge," *Conflict Trends* no. 1 (January 2010): 46-54.

Sukanya Podder discusses the tautness within the security sector reform, which she views from a conceptual aspect as a division in state building process. She used the UNMIL and its drawdown plan as an example to examine the gaps in the concept of SSR, and how it has created an uncertainty among international policy and practices, and how it also influences reform of internal security capacity in real time. She discusses the hybrid linkages that analyze the framework of the reality of most SSR performance. According to her research findings, she discovered imperative lessons that discuss a need for developing local institutions and capacities in place of externally driven social engineering projects that enhance dependency. Her research also concentrated on enabling the neighborhood with a definitive objective of SSR, to be specific, the recreation of legitimate and individual-focused security organizations. In her conclusion, she expressed the complexity that interplays among international approaches and local realities in post-conflict state building. Using the case study of SSR in Liberia with the drawdown of international peacebuilding presence, she justified the outcomes and gaps that are associated with the peacebuilding process, which controls the reality of hybrid, formal, and non-formal structures and actors in the security and justice provision.[17] She also listed four points in her conclusion about the SSR experience in Liberia, which included:

> The first is to underline that deviations from the monopoly model of SSR are a norm in state building practice, second is the selective focus on institutional reform rather than system-wide transformation can result in weak democratic accountability frameworks, third is the on-going dependence on external donors for logistics, equipment and operational capacity in addition to training and mentoring can create a wider capability gap than should be the case with a

[17] Sukanya Podder, "Bridging the 'Conceptual–Contextual' Divide: Security Sector Reform in Liberia and UNMIL Transition," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 7, no. 3 (13 March 2013): 353-80, accessed 19 October 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2013.770242.

> successful SSR and the fourth concluding point that flows from the above discussion is that SSR outcomes are symptomatic of the complexity underlying international engagement in post-conflict state building.[18]

J. Shola Omotola discusses in his article how the security sector in Liberia is faced with major challenges within its emerging democracy. He talks about potential paths for the security sectors in Liberia after the fifteen-year war. He also analyzes the prospects of enduring reform and reconstruction, and sustainable peace, democracy, and development. He stated the major assignment for the GoL is to create a vibrant and accountable security sector that will be controlled by civil authorities. He also specifies a need for encouraging a strong civil-military connection, which will improve the trust of local populace. He stated security agencies in Liberia need to focus on a code of conduct, which relates to civil society.[19]

Mark Malan discussed Liberian SSR as a partial success, but also laid down many other factors that need implementation for a long-term peace and stability plan. He also discussed and examined the UN Doctrine for Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) copout provision connected to the UN mission, which is expressed in its Capstone Doctrine:

> Given their relatively short lifespan and limited access to program funds and specialist expertise, UN peacekeeping operations are neither mandated nor resourced to engage in the long-term peace-building activities required to achieve the objectives identified above. Other actors, both within and outside the UN system, normally undertake the bulk of this work.[20]

---

[18] Ibod., 22-23.

[19] J. Shola Omotola, "Beyond Transition: Challenges of Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction in Liberia," *Journal of Security Sector Management* 4, no. 4 (November 2006): 2-5.

[20] Mark Malan, *Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US War College, March 2008),

He also mentions, with this acknowledgment, the UNMIL has also facilitated the process by engaging key partners in the institutional and capacity building of all the security agencies, preparing the atmosphere for those major actors able to support such activities over the long term. He also stated the Liberian SSR program continues to face challenges. If the UN Security Council continues to direct the mission to perform SSR tasks, more budget allocation will be needed.[21]

According to Jennifer Lazuta's article, she discussed the crucial drawdown of the United Nations peacekeeping troops in Liberia, and how it has been embraced by the world and international partners as a significant step forward in the post-war peace process. She also stated the opinions of many Liberians, who saw the peacekeeping drawdown as untimely, fear that the absence of UN troops could derail peace causing security complications within a fragile Liberia. She also mentioned the GoL did not welcome the UN peacekeeping drawdown and requested a slower withdrawal of UN troops. She talked about comments made by Isabelle Abric, who is the Chief of Public Information for UNMIL. "It's actually a sign of success, and just shows that Liberian security has increased, has grown stronger," Abric noted. "It was not a decision that the Security Council just took like that. It was after assessing the capacity of the Liberian

64-69, accessed 18 October 2016, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=855.

[21]Ibid.

security agencies in general."[22] She concluded that the UN has stated its commitment, and they have added 420 UN police personnel to help with the transition.[23]

During a meeting of the Security Council held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on April 2015, the council strengthened its position on the drawdown of all uniform UNMIL personnel that are serving in Liberia. The Security Council stated that they had to scale down the withdrawal in September 2014 due to the Ebola outbreak in the country. Based on resolution 2215 (2015) under UN Charter, Chapter VII, the Special Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG), head of UNMIL, was again mandated to continue the withdrawal of peacekeepers, which continues the third phase of the phased drawdown. The UN also stated that it would no longer participate and support senatorial elections, which was outlined in the resolution 2190 (2014). The Council also repeated its expectation that the GoL be prepared to take full responsibility of its security affairs by June 2016. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to streamline the activities of UNMIL across its civilian, military, police, and other security components as it continues the security transition in Liberia. The Council also calls on the governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire to continue reinforcing their coordination in terms of security at their border points.[24]

---

[22] Jennifer Lazuta, "UN Takes Next Steps in Drawdown of Military Presence in Liberia," *Voice of America News*, 15 January 2013, accessed 17 October 2016, http://www.voanews.com/a/un-military-drawdown-in-liberia/1584118.html.

[23] Ibid.

[24] United Nations, "Security Council Authorizes Resumed Drawdown of United Nations Mission in Liberia, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2215 (2015)," accessed 2 April 2017, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11849.doc.htm.

According to Ingrid Silalahi, the drawdown of UNMIL is nearing, and UN authorities have met with the GoL to talk about the move and measures that are still needing support. Speaking at this meeting, the present SRSG of UNMIL, Farid Zarif, talked about the security transition that was slated for 30 June 2016, and how it would be an important achievement for Liberia and the international community as a whole. He also mentioned that UNMIL would play an active role in supporting the GoL in building its security capabilities.

According to UNMIL, Zarif also identified there has become an "increasing sense of unease and apprehension among Liberians across the board about UNMIL's drawdown and the prospect of its departure."[25] Likewise, the Liberian President demonstrated her concern in a joint letter with President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d'Ivoire, that encouraged the UN Secretary General to demand the UN Security Council keep a "Quick Reaction Force" in both Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire until after the 2017 Liberian general election.[26]

According to Karin Landgren, the GoL has since approved of the plan for the UNMIL drawdown and also approved a comprehensive security transition plan that will facilitate a Liberian security take over. She said the GoL and the security sector have demonstrated a high level of confidence in taking over of their own security. She alluded to the fact that, for the security transition to be successful, the GoL must constantly prioritize the security sector and the rule of law. She also mentioned that community

[25] Ingrid Silalahi and Bora Kamwanya, "Liberia–UNMIL, Toward the Completion of the Security Transition," *Institute for Peace in Partnership* (25 March 2016): 2-5, accessed 17 October 2016, https://ippjournal.wordpress.com/2016/03/25/liberia-unmil-toward-the-completion-of-the-security-transition/.

[26] Ibid.

support has a major role in the transition plan. She said as the UNMIL prepares to leave, the UN and its partners will continue to play a supporting to the GoL to strengthen its security capacity and other critical processes, which are tied to long-term peace and stability, national reconciliation, and the SSR. She stated UNMIL's transition is a complex decision, but it is also incumbent on the people of Liberia and key leaders to adequately solve the root causes of its fragility. She also stated the Liberians need to hold together and maintain the peace and stability that have been sustained by the UNMIL.[27]

According to J. Burgess Carter, the budget allocation needed for Defense, Security, Intelligence, and Veterans Affairs is approximately US $104.8 million, which the Senate Committee submitted to the Senate plenary for the 2015-2018 fiscal period, which the GoL cannot bear alone. The Senate committee submitted a recommendation to the Senate to request help from international partners that is crucial to the UNMIL 2016 drawdown. Justice Minister Councilor Benedict Sannoh, the head of the committee, told the Senate that he convinced Madam Sirleaf to include the UNMIL departure plan in the Post-Ebola recovery plan, and called the GoL to exhibit political-will to ensure the UNMIL drawdown plan is successful.[28]

The UN Security Council has already extended the mandate for three conservative years, which was meant to allow the GoL to adequately prepare to assume the security

---

[27] Karin Landgren, "The Drawdown of the UN Mission in Liberia Resumes," *Huffington Post*, 29 June 2015, accessed 18 October 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/karin-landgren/the-drawdown-of-the-un-mi_b_7126020.html.

[28] J. Burgess Carter, "Over US$104.8M Needed for UNMIL Drawdown," *Daily Observer*, 24 April 2015, accessed 18 October 2016, http://liberianobserver.com/news-politics/over-us1048m-needed-unmil-drawdown.

responsibility of the country. The due date for UNMIL drawdown was slated for September 2015, but was again postponed until 2016. The UNMIL drawdown plan is critical to Liberia. With the UNMIL's support, the GoL is in a serious dialogue with key partners and UN Security Council on major security issues that relate to stability in and across the borders of Liberia. As the UNMIL drawdown continues, the GoL has slowly taken over the security responsibility of the country. However, the question still remains whether the GoL is ready to assume security with all the socioeconomic challenges facing the country, especially after the recent Ebola crisis. It will be very important for UNMIL to delay its drawdown because of the 2017 election, which has already shown signs of tension. Because of the reasons already stated, Senator Nyonblee Karnga-Lawrence, who is the senator of Grand Bassa County, requested a meeting with all the security institutions to gain an insight into how the security sector will function after the UNMIL drawdown. The Senator also expressed some major concerns about the AFL's strength, and if the police and immigration services are equipped and prepared to carry out their duties after the UNMIL leaves. Nyoublee concluded, "We are seriously concerned about the aftermath of UNMIL drawdown because it has to do with the security of Liberia and Liberians."[29]

The Security Council resolution 1509 (2003) was the original mandate that brought the UNMIL into existence. This mandate finally took effect on 19 September 2003. The original mandate has gone through numerous adjustments over the years to coincide with the security situations and current developments in Liberia. The most recent being resolution 2215 (2015) of 2 April 2015. There is not much difference between the two

[29] All Africa, "Liberia: We Are Concern about the Aftermath of UNMIL Drawdown," accessed 31 October 2016, http://allafrica.com/stories/201503201684.html.

resolutions. Security Council resolution 1509 (2003), which set the stage for the intervention of peacekeepers, discusses the establishment of a UNMIL, followed by a call for a stability force under resolution 1497 (2003). The mission's duration was limited to only twelve months, and the Secretary-General transferred authority from the ECOWAS-led ECOMIL forces to UNMIL on 1 October 2003.This resolution further stated that UNMIL be comprised of approximately 15,000 UN military personnel, consisting of 250 military observers, 160 staff officer and over 1,115 civilian police. The establishment of formed police units was put in place to support law and order in Liberia. This mandate also discussed key factors that relate to the protection of UN Staff, facilities and civilians, support for humanitarian and human rights assistance, and support for security reform.[30]

According to the most recent resolution 2215 (2015) of 2 April 2015, it directed that the UNMIL mandate would subsequently change to follow a specific priority order, stated below:

Protection of Civilians. The primary responsibility of the Liberian authorities is to protect all Liberians from threat of bodily violence within it abilities and within its respective deployment area.

Humanitarian Assistance Support. Concerns the facilitation of humanitarian assistance in accordance and collaboration with the GoL and other partners, by assisting with the establishment of a conducive security atmosphere for NGOs or IGOs to operate. It also mentioned GoL coordination with the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) during the Ebola outbreak in Liberia.

[30] United Nation Security Council, Resolution 1509, 2003, accessed 23 October 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1509.

Reform of Justice and Security Institutions. This section discusses assistance to GoL in formulating and implementing close coordination between bilateral and multilateral partners for the GoL's national strategy on the SSR. It advised the GoL on the SSR, and provided technical assistance to LNP and BIN with a focus on leadership and internal management systems. This section also talked about the assistance to the GoL in expanding the rule of law and security sector service into the country, which includes training and capacity building. It also discusses providing assistance to the GoL to coordinate between international partners, including key donors of security assistance.

Human Rights Promotion and Protection**.** This mainly discusses the promotion, protection, and monitoring of human rights in Liberia. It also discusses support for the GoL to strengthen and combat sexual and gender-based violence, and bringing perpetrators to justice.

Protection of UN Personnel. This section discusses the protection of all UN personnel, installations, equipment, and freedom of movement of its personnel.[31]

Additionally, literature that is important to the formulation of the Security Sector is the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), held in Accra, 18 August 2003. This peace agreement gives rise to the first peace agreement that ended the civil conflict in Liberia. The CPA was a framework based on the ECOWAS peace process for Liberia, chaired by John Agyekum Kufuor, President of the Republic of Ghana and the Chairman of ECOWAS. This agreement discusses ceasefire monitoring, international stabilization force, disengagement, cantonment, disarmament, demobilization rehabilitation,

[31] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1509.

reintegration of fighters, disbandment of irregular forces, and reforming and restructuring of the Liberian Armed Forces. The agreement also discusses restructuring of the LNP and other security services, human rights, humanitarian relief, and electoral reform. This document describes the framework on how post-war Liberia should implement the peace agreement.[32]

The Army Designed Methodology (ADM) will serve as the doctrinal framework in analyzing this research. The ADM is taken from chapter 2 of the US Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0. This publication discusses and defines planning and lists the importance and effectiveness of planning, placing special emphasis on the Army's planning methodologies.

ADM enables commanders to apply operational art, which develops and describes their visualization. ADM also enables commanders to interact and collaborate with high echelon, adjacent, and subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action partners to assist them in building their visualization. Commanders use operational variables (PMESII, ASCOPE) and mission variables (METT-TC) to examine the operational environment. The application of ADM to this research will enable a clear visualization of the current environment, operational approach to achieving, or reaching a desirable end state. This procedure usually applies to all unified action partners, which includes military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Looking at the current situation in Liberia, a doctrinal framework

[32] United States Institute of Peace.

will need to be applied to analyze the current environment. ADM will serve as a preferred doctrinal tool in discussing and analyzing this research objective.[33]

Chapter Summary

The above review of literature discusses how the concept of SSR came about, and how this concept has played a major role in the quest for peace in major conflict nations. The review of literature also takes a look at other scholars' concepts and perspectives of SSR. The literature review above also looked at the SSR in Liberia, and how the government of Liberia will maintain and support it as the UNMIL drawdown.

[33] US Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5.0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012).

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodology

To answer the primary and secondary questions of this thesis, a qualitative methodology will be necessary to analyze the extensive literature on the SSR in Liberia. The methodology chosen for this research is the ADM. According to ADRP 5-0, ADM is a strategy for applying basic and innovative speculation to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and ways to deal with tackling them. It is also an iterative procedure of understanding and problem framing that utilizes components of operational art to consider and build an operational approach to deal with recognized problems. This design consists of adequately framing the situational environment, framing the existing problem, and coming up with an operational and suitable approach in solving those problems.[34]

Step 1: Current State of Affairs

Framing an operational environment also focuses on defining, analyzing, and synthesizing the characteristics of the operational and mission variables. There are several models to help describe the environment. These include Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII), Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organization, People, and Event (ASCOPE), and Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME). For the purpose of detailed analysis, covering all aspects of the

[34] US Army, ADRP 5-0.

PMESII model will be adequate and effective to describe the current state in Liberia. The analysis will look at the political climate with respect to some of the key political actors, government capability and capacity, agendas, and how they have significantly influenced the reform process. In the military analysis, a critical look will be made of the three major security groups: the army, police, and immigration, to examine their capabilities, mission and resource constraints, and how they may have affected the reform process. The economic factors and how they have influenced the reform process will be reviewed. Social factors and how critical they are to the research including living conditions, rate of literacy and educational level will be reviewed as to how they affect the reform process. The final two aspects of the PMESII model will look at the effects on the physical infrastructure, which include educational and health facilities, and the effects of the information and key elements that facilitate the transfer of information to and among the local populace.

Step 2: Desired State

The beginning of any plan prepares for a conducive and favorable desired end state. The desired end state comprises of the desired conditions that, if achieved, meet the intents of policy, orders, guidance, and directives issued by higher authorities. The desired condition also serves as the future state of the operational environment. The operational environment may be tangible or intangible, military or nonmilitary. Since every operation focuses on a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable end state, success hinges on

accurately describing those conditions. These conditions form the basis for decisions that ensure operations progress consistently toward a desired end state.[35]

Step 3: Frame of the Problem

Framing the problem is simply identifying the major differences between the desired state and that of the current situation within a given environment. According to ADM, framing the environment and the problem will give rise to an adequate approach to solve the problem. Problem framing also involves identifying and understanding those issues that impede progress toward the desired end state.[36]

Step 4: Approach to Solving the Problem

The operational approach is the broad general actions that will be taken in order to come out with an adequate solution to the problem. According to ADM, "planners can depict the operational approach by using lines of effort that graphically articulate the links among tasks, objectives, conditions, and the desired end state. ADM offers the latitude to portray the operational approach in a manner that best communicates its vision and structure."[37]

Drawing of Conclusions and Recommendation

From the analysis of the data in chapter 2, conclusions were derived regarding how the concept applied using the ADM. The below diagram provides a visual picture of ADM

[35] US Army, ADRP 5-0.

[36] Ibid., 2-41.

[37] Ibid.

and its application. The researcher will discuss the current situation, desired end state, the gap impeding effort in achieving the end state and the approach to coming out with an adequate solution. This framework will enable the drawing of conclusions and recommendations for future studies.



Figure 4. Conceptual Framework

Source: Created by Author.

Chapter Summary

The research for this thesis is centered on a qualitative method using ADM. The model used to support ADM is PMESII (Political Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information). This methodology will give the conceptual framework to answer the primary and secondary research questions in order to draw conclusions and recommendations for the SSR in Liberia.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Chapter Introduction

In order to address the primary and secondary research questions presented in chapter 1, this chapter will analyze the collected qualitative sources using the four frames of the ADM:

Frame 1 will analyze the contextual understanding of the current security situation as UNMIL continues its drawdown.

Frame 2 will discuss the desirable end-state of the UN mandate, Comprehensive Peace Accord, and Security Sector program.

Frame 3 will analyze major gaps and obstacles that are impeding the progress of the SSR.

Frame 4 will analyze a broader approach to enable an adequate solution to the problem.

To adequately discuss and analyze these four frames, this research will use the operational variables of PMESII as a conceptual model in the chapter.



Figure 5: Design Methodology

Source: Created by Author

Frame 1: The Current Security Situation in Liberia

Political

During the conflict, the political system in Liberia broke down due the fierce fighting among warlords seeking to gain territories. The coming of the UNMIL saw the first peaceful presidential and legislative elections that brought President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to power in 2005. Since then, the political climate in Liberia has shifted to an improved state, where other political parties are free to voice their grievances without fear in accordance with the rule of law and Constitution of the land. According to a Carter Center report on the 2011 election, the presidential and legislative elections are described as a "test for the country's transition from war to democratic and constitutional

government." The report stated the high level of professionalism that various political parties demonstrated during the campaign process, terming it as peaceful and vibrant. There was a total of sixteen political parties in this election, and, at the end, President Sirleaf won her second term as president. President Sirleaf served two terms under the Constitution, so she is not eligible to run again in the upcoming 2017 election. There have been growing political tensions in Liberia as UNMIL prepares to depart and turning over security responsibilities to the GoL and the security forces in Liberia.[38]

In March 2016, a peaceful protest held by the Joint Action Committee (JAC), a group of political parties and civil society groups, requested an extension of the UNMIL mandate until Liberia's 2017 presidential and legislative elections. Presenting the group petition to the SRSG, Farid Zarif, JAC leader Mulbah Morlu expressed the group's driven desire for national stability. Morlu stated that they appreciated the intervention and leadership style of the SRSG, and that if the GoL practiced the same attitude, there wouldn't be any problem in Liberia today, because there will always be a reason for roundtable discussion that resolves common differences on democratic issues and national security. Morlu also mentioned some instances between security agencies that could cause insecurity in the country. The most recent instance was the standoff between those of the Liberia National Police (LNP) and the Executive Protection Service (EPS) that brought the city of Monrovia into a total lockdown. He also said that petitioning the Vice President to run as president of the ruling party ticket with his relationship to the Defense Minister

[38] Carter Center, "Liberia Elections in Brief: Oct. 11 Presidential and Legislative Elections 'Critical Test'," 9 October 2011, accessed 15 February 2017, https://www.carter center.org/news/features/p/elections/liberia/in-brief.html.

put the AFL in a non-neutral role. With these unfolding issues, he reiterated that the UN should remain until 2017 presidential and legislative elections. On the other hand, the SRSG also promised to submit the petition to the Security Council.[39]

Military

The military in PMESII refers to the security agencies, which include the AFL, LNP, EPS, DEA, and BIN within Liberia. After the end of the civil conflict and the intervention of UNMIL, Liberia has successfully managed the balance of peace and stability. The original mandate of UNMIL, set out by Security Council resolution 1509 (2003), directed protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance support, reform of justice and security institutions, human rights promotion and protection. The peacekeepers have completed this mandate and are now leaving Liberia. The framework outlined in resolution 1509 was successfully achieved, and the time for the drawdown expired in June 2016. During the fifteen years that the UNMIL stayed in Liberia, the reform of justice and security institutions had been a major issue that the UN and GoL had discussed over the years. UNMIL had the responsibility to help the GoL achieved the following:

> To assist the Government of Liberia in developing and implementing, as soon as possible and in close coordination with bilateral and multilateral partners, its national strategy on Security Sector Reform (SSR). To advise the Government of Liberia on SSR and the organization of the LNP and BIN to provide technical assistance, co-location and mentoring programs for the LNP and BIN, with a particular focus on developing the leadership and internal management systems of the LNP and BIN, as well as for justice and corrections. To assist the Government of Liberia in extending national justice and security sector services throughout the country through capacity-building and training; to assist the Government of

[39] Edwin Genoway, Jr., "Liberia: Consistent Threat–Political Parties, Csos Petition UN to Stay," All Africa, 13 March 2016, accessed 3 March 2017, http://allafrica.com/stories/201603141978.

> Liberia to coordinate these efforts with all partners, including bilateral and multilateral donors.[40]

Did UNMIL, the GoL and security sector in Liberia successfully accomplish these enormous tasks stated above? As much as they have made numerous gains, the security sector still has major challenges that need to be address before UNMIL finally pulls out. The announcement and official turnover of security affairs on 10 June 2016 to the GoL and the security sector has raised signs of insecurity within the country. Social groups, the civilian populace, and politicians took to the street peacefully seeking to continue the stay of UNMIL, since its presence helped. Liberia conduct two successful presidential elections. With the upcoming presidential election in October 2017, most Liberians feel the timing is wrong for the drawdown.[41]

Economic

The economic system in Liberia has undergone a major collapse and difficulties during the fifteen years of its civil crises. According to Geepu-Nah Tiepoh, a Professor of Economics at Vanier College, who studied the evolution of military conflicts in African countries, these conflicts point directly to a troubling irony that often occurs over the control and distribution of accessible economic and resources of a country. These military conflicts always plunder and prevent African economies' growth. Liberia's economy came to a standstill during its civil conflict, and its resources were not only destroyed by war, but also looted by major protagonists of the war. In such an atmosphere of destruction, the

[40] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1509.

[41] Ibid.

economy was greatly affected, and most developmental programs failed to take advantage of opportunities and openings in world economy.[42]

The arrival of UNMIL in Liberia was significant to the peace and a key factor in beginning Liberia's economic comeback. After a peaceful presidential and legislative election in 2005, Liberia's economy was once again prepared to take part in global trade. Presently, Liberia's economy has tremendously suffered in growth due to two major shocks during 2014-2016. The outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) and the fall in international export prices for Liberia's iron ore and rubber affected its revenue of 2014-2015 by 0.4 percent. The projected GDP growth of 2.8 percent in 2016 was resulted from the public infrastructure projects and mining, but the UNMIL peacekeeping force drawdown will affect and decrease the demand in services, which will force the GoL to take full responsibility for the security sector and costs attached to it. As Liberia is recovering from the Ebola outbreak, it is also experiencing lower revenue growth and limits that restrict borrowing. The crucial support for Liberia economic growth also relies on increasingly improving infrastructure and focus on the business environment, which will be important to diversify the economy and enable inclusive growth.[43]

[42] Geepu-Nah Tiepoh, "The Liberian Economy: The Path from Loot to Development (Part I)," The Perspective, accessed 3 March 2017, http://theperspective.org/economy1.html.

[43] Patrick Hettinger and Janice Olivia James, "African Economic Outlook: Liberia," accessed 3 March 2017, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/country-notes/liberia.

Social

After the civil conflict, Liberia has struggled with its social dimension. The fifteen years of devastating civil crises have turned the country to one of the poorest and under-developed countries in the world. According to the World Bank announcement, about 54 percent of the population of Liberia is living below the poverty line. This means they live on less than $2.00 a day. According to the survey report, the number amounts to 2.1 million Liberians who were unable to meet their basic food and non-food needs in 2015. According to the World Bank, collection of development indicators compiled from officially recognized sources, the literacy rate of people ages 15-24 in Liberia was reported at 54.47 percent in 2015.[44] The education system in Liberia is developing from the lengthened period of the civil turmoil. The effect from the war, combined with the closure of schools due to EVD outbreak continues to have impact on the fragile education system. Looking at most African countries in nearly all education statistics, Liberia finds itself behind. The civil conflict resulted in the destruction of the trained workforce, and Liberia is still in rebuilding process of its educational system. The Ministry of Education is working with donors to address the quality of education, and challenges facing access.[45]

Information

The nature of Liberia information dissemination to the civilian populace by different groups is one of the most transparent since the civil conflict. The primary means

[44] World Bank Group, "Poverty Report: Liberia," 2015, accessed 4 May 2017, http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/LBR.

[45] USAID, "Liberia: Education," accessed 4 May 2017, https://www.usaid.gov/liberia/education.

for disseminating information is through programs on local radio stations, print media, and electronic media. The media has contributed immensely to the peace and development of Liberia. Journalists, managers, and editors have shown the high level of efficiency in the way they disseminate news reports and use local talk shows to discuss the reconciliation process in Liberia.

The Liberia media have played a major role in expediting the daily dissemination of news and information to the citizens, businesses, political parties, and other groups, which has helped the rebuilding process. Additionally, the growth of new social and electronic media have helped most journalists share and interact with other reporters and media houses in the role for peace. As a result, other partners, like USAID, are working with these local and international media houses to develop new technology, professional skills, and the sense of independence.[46]

Infrastructure

An important key to development of any nation is its infrastructure, yet the Liberian infrastructure suffered from the devastating civil crises and the slow pace of post-war development. Most of the roads are in deplorable conditions. Roads in rural Liberia are inaccessible and damaged due to lack of long-term maintenance. In urban areas, Liberia needs more good roads and sidewalks for pedestrians, which are a safety measure for Liberia's crowded streets.[47]

---

[46] Mark Koenig, "Celebrating Media's Impact on Development on World Press Freedom Day," 3 May 2012, accessed 10 March 2017, https://blog.usaid.gov/2012/05/celebrating-medias-impact-on-development-on-world-press-freedom-day-2/.

[47] Tewroh-Wehtoe Sungbeh, "Liberian Government Must Invest in Infrastructure Projects to Create Jobs and Give Country Major Facelift," The Liberian Dialogue, 7

The post-war energy infrastructure is one of the main areas affecting Liberia development relative to other African countries, particularly when it comes to electrical power. In 2011, Liberia's rate of access to electricity was less than one percent, with Liberia Electricity Company (LEC) effectively serving about one percent of the Monrovia urban population. However, by 2011 there has been great progress made to improve and restore electricity in Monrovia. It received approximately six mega-watts of electricity power courtesy of development and donor partners. By early December 2011, LEC was able to increase power to almost 3,100 customers. The GoL also made progress in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Mount Coffee hydrodam, which is the most significant infrastructure project currently in progress.[48]

December 2016, http://theliberiandialogue.org/2016/12/07/liberian-government-must-invest-in-infrastructure-projects-to-create-jobs-and-give-country-major-facelift/.

[48] African Development Bank Group, Li*beria Infrastructure and Inclusive Growth* (Tunisia: Temporary Relocation Agency, 2013), accessed 18 March 2016, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Liberia_-_Infrastructure_and_Inclusive_Growth_-_Full_Report.pdf.

Table 1 Summary of the Current State of Liberia	
P	The current political situation in Liberia has been stable since the coming of UNMIL, and Liberians have conducted two successful presidential and legislative elections.
M	The Armed Forces of Liberia was restructured in 2006 and has developed into professional “Force for Good”. Other security apparatus has also been restructured in accordance with the reform program.
E	The Liberian economy was hit badly during the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease and with the falling prices of export commodities on the world market. It is still struggling to get back on its feet.
S	A high rate of poverty and young adult illiteracy still exists. There are few job opportunities and people do not have access to the necessities of life.
I	Information dissemination in Liberia has improved dramatically over the past years, and the media is one of the most transparent institutions since the civil conflict.
I	Much of the infrastructure was destroyed during the prolonged civil crises and the pace of redevelopment is very slow. The country lacks good roads, good infrastructure, and hospitals. Its urban areas remain underdeveloped...

Source: Created by Author.

Frame 2: Desired End-State (SSR, UN, CPA)

The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) held in Accra was to negotiate the peace settlement between warring factions and the GoL. It was mediated by the Chairman of ECOWAS and other international partners to end the civil crises that engulfed Liberia for fifteen years. This accord served as one of the main pillars of peace in the war torn country of Liberia. Another key instrument that played a major role in the implementation of peace and stability in Liberia was the UN mandate that brought peacekeepers to Liberia. The CPA and UN peacekeeping mandate will served as instruments to examine the SSR program vision and desirable end state using PMESII.

Political

The CPA discusses the political dimensions that were associated with the civil conflict in Liberia. It envisions a peaceful environment where all political parties will heed to peace in accordance with the law. The establishment of the Governance Reform Commission demonstrated how the political atmosphere should appear. The mandate of the Governance Reform Commission was mainly to promote good government by monitoring the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and assisting with the presidential election. The CPA also envisions an environment where all the three branches of government—executive, legislative, and judiciary—run the affairs of the country.[49]

The UN mandate for Liberia visualizes a country of peace and stability, protection of children in armed conflict, free of small arms, a well-trained and professional security sector that will be able to assume the responsibilities and duties of security affairs after UN peacekeepers depart, and a legitimate and stable transition of government and power.[50]

Military

The CPA vision and desirable end for the military, warring factions, and other security groups was stated precisely in the peace agreement. In Part Three, Article VI, the CPA discusses the Cantonment, Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (CDDRR), which was essential to stop the blood bath in the country. The

[49] United States Institute of Peace.

[50] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1509.

CPA called for the rapid implementation of the agreement of the CDDRR by all the parties that took part in the fighting. It stated that all combatants remain in their respective areas until the formulation of the New Liberia Armed Forces or integration into civilian life. Part Four, Article VII, discusses the CPA vision for the SSR. It talks about the disbandment of all irregular forces, reforming, and restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). It stated the AFL should be restructured with a different command structure. It also stated that the restructured army be drawn from all the warring factions and that of the existing Armed Forces. The major role of ECOWAS, UN, and African Union (AU) was to support the process by assisting with advisory teams, logistics, and equipment.

In the CPA, Article VIII talks about the restructuring of the LNP and other security services. It emphasized the development of a professional code of conduct, human rights, and non-partisan methodology to duty and being free of corruption. The agreement also called on the UN to assist and monitor the development of the security forces.[51]

The UN mandate for Liberia discusses the implementation and support of the SSR. The UN 1509 mandate emphasizes on the following:

> [T]o assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia; consistent with democratic policing; to develop a civilian police training program; and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations; and interested States; to assist the transitional government in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian military in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations and interested States.[52]

[51] United States Institute of Peace.

[52] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1509.

Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure

The CPA and the UN mandate emphasized the political, military, and information aspects, but did not take into consideration the economic, social, and infrastructure aspects while developing their agreements. For information, the UN stressed the need for a public information capacity, which will promote understanding of the peace process. However, the failure to address the economic, social, and infrastructure aspects may cost Liberia dearly in the long run in maintaining a stable peace and security sector of the country. The growth of every nation relies on economic growth. The growth also relies on good infrastructure and a peaceful environment where flow of information is obtainable. These critical aspects encourage investors and international trade, which brings about development to a nation. Liberia needs growth in economy, information, infrastructure, and its social dimensions to meet its desired end state. Because the analysis revealed no specific desirable conditions for the economic, social, and infrastructure, the researcher inferred them based upon the current conditions presented in table 1.

Table 2 Summary of the Desired End State of Liberia	
P	Liberia promotes good governance and a democratic system. Envisions a peaceful environment where all political parties will ahead to peace in accordance with law. Visualizes a country of peace and stability, protection of children in armed conflict, free of small proliferation and a well-trained and professional security sector that will assume the responsibilities and duties as UNMIL drawdown.
M	The CDDRR is abided by all parties. All irregular forces are disbanded. The AFL is restructure and the LNP viewed as a professional force.
E	An economy that will be self-reliant and be able to develop a conducive atmosphere for open market, which will encourage international investors.
S	Poverty and illiteracy rates steadily decline while jobs opportunities steadily grow.
I	To develop a needs for a public information capacity to promote understanding of the peace process
I	GoL has a well-developed plan for infrastructure rehabilitation that steadily improves the road network and hospitals

Source: Created by Author.

Frame 3: Framing the Problem

In comparing the current and desired state of Liberia, three distinct obstacles emerge: drop in donors' financial in support of the SSR program; inability of GoL to finance its SSR; and time constraint of the effectiveness of the SSR program.

Drop in Donor Spending for SSR Program

With Liberia's weak economy, the GoL has been depending solely on international donor assistance in the rebuilding of its security sector. They provided the bulk of the financial support and technical capacity, without which the GoL would not have been able to generate security and justice related reform. However, the decrease of donor support since 2012 has greatly slowed down the pace of the SSR program. Donor contributions declined from US $32 million in fiscal years 2008-2009 to $23 million in fiscal 2010-2011

(UNMIL spending excluded). For apparent causes, the GoL budget allocation to the security sector has not been sufficient to compensate for the immense decline in donor funding recently.[53]

Inability of GoL to Finance the SSR Program

The GoL has struggled on how to prioritize the major activities of the security agencies: personnel, obtaining organizational capacity, and the skills needed to uphold the peace and stability presently achieved. The GoL needs US $712 million to finance the SSR from 2012-2019 fiscal years. In establishing priorities for the Liberia security sector, a well-planned strategic approach will be needed to rank the functions of the security against the financial reality. This strategic approach is entrenched in the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) that the GoL announced in 2013. The framework talked about two different approaches that will be used in the process. The top down approach calls for the setting of a resource for the security sector and allocating resources within the sector. This approach will give the security sector a concise and clear mandate in making policy at the highest level of government to establish priorities for the security and budget allocation conversant by the security strategic objective. The bottom-up approach calls for the security sector evaluation and analysis of different costs and revenue sources accessible for the security sector to reach at comprehensible options.[54]

---

[53] Karen Barnes Robinson and Craig Valters with Tove Strauss and Aaron Weah, "Progress in Small Steps Security against the Odds in Liberia," Overseas Development Institute, January 2015, 37, accessed 4 March 2017, https://www.odi.org /sites/odi.org.uk/ files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9420.pdf.

[54] Liberia Public Expenditure Review Note, "Meeting the Challenges of the UNMIL Security Transition," Report No. 71009-LR.2013 25, accessed 4 February 2016,

Time Constraint for the Effectiveness of the SSR Program

The time constraint for the reconstruction and training of the security services is another major obstacle impeding the SSR progress. The implementation of the SSR program started in 2006, and was provided the full responsibilities of it security affairs in June 2016.[55] Regardless of the timeframe for the SSR program, the LNP and the AFL reform still experienced a slow pace to meet up with the increasing security demands in the country. The AFL needs to be rebuilt and trained from scratch, but the UNMIL mandate requires a functional AFL and other security sectors for a smooth transition. The current security structure lacks adequate senior level leaders, personnel, and logistic support to provide the necessary security for the country. These challenges confronted by the security sector require more ample time and patience to build and equip the SSR.

Table 3 Summary of the Problem	
1	The drop in of donors' financial support has slow down the pace of readiness of the security sector to provide adequate security required.
2	The inability of GoL to fund the security sector has created a situation whereby the GoL and security sectors cannot function independently.
3	The time frame for the SSR program will not allow the complete development of the security sector before the withdrawal of UNMIL and donors.

Source: Created by Author.

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/524941468055756666/pdf/710090ESW0P1270C0disclosed030130130.pdf.

[55] Silalahi and Kamwanya.

Frame 4: An Approach to Solve the Problem

The solution to the enormous predicaments of the security SSR is far from over. However, the progress of the SSR program depends on the GoL with the support of other international partners. The GoL needs to adequately approach the challenges by creating a favorable condition that will support the quick attainment of the SSR program. Therefore, this section will consider the political, economic, social, and infrastructure dimensions as lines of effort (LOE) to solve these three problems.

Political LOE

In its effort to rebuild the security sector, the GoL should embark on strengthening the government institutions in the country. If the government institutions are weak, it will reflect on the security sectors in the long run. Therefore, the GoL needs to give autonomy to the judiciary branch, military, police, immigration, and the drug enforcement agencies in order for them to function independently. The GoL also needs to promote transparency and accountability in its dealings, which further encourages international donors. The government should also rally support from partners and engage in security cooperation activities toward building the security sector.

Economic LOE

The GoL should continuously work with international partners, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and donor governments to solve major issues that need to be addressed for long-term development. Sustaining the growth demands for practical policy and actions from all necessary strategic fronts. The GoL needs to maintain its open market system that will encourage investors to Liberia, create job opportunities, and engage the

WTO to assist Liberia and or help it in obtaining membership to help its economy. The government also needs to continue negotiations for reasonable concession agreements, create transparency in the flow of financial activities, and generate economic prospects in parts surrounding the concessions. This will improve the nation economy and help solve its developmental program.

Social and Infrastructure LOE

The GoL also needs to dedicate more effort to the social and infrastructure dimensions. The two factors are so intertwined that discussing one without the other is difficult. After the civil conflict, the social norms of society were divided due to the ethnic lines by which the crises were fought. The GoL still needs to continue the reconciliation process to bring all Liberia together for the peace and stability of the nation. The GoL also needs to focus on youth development, empowerment, and educational opportunities, which will allow youth to change their focus to more important aspects of life, rather than what was experienced during the fifteen years of civil conflict.

The devastating civil conflict brought extensive destruction of roads, bridges, power supplies, water, schools, clinics, and government buildings throughout the country. Rebuilding this infrastructure is vital to Liberia's recovery and development. As much as the GoL has started to rehabilitate some key roads with the support of the donor community, the process is difficult and moving at a slow pace. The GoL needs to improve these roads because it is vital to reinvigorating agriculture and natural resource-based industries, creating economic opportunities and strengthening local and district governments as well as security operatives' response to calls. The GoL also needs more

focus on health and education services, which is important for all Liberians and the foundation for sustained growth and development.



Figure 5. Operational Approach

Source: Created by Author.

Chapter Summary

This chapter discussed the current security situation as the UNMIL continues their drawdown, the desirable end-state of UN mandate, Comprehensive Peace Accord, and Security Sector program, major gaps and obstacles that are impeding the progress SSR

and what broad approach needs implementation to enable an adequate solution to the problem. If these obstacles and challenges identified in this chapter are effectively dealt with or solved, there can be an enhancement and boost in the SSR program. It is also incumbent on the GoL and other international donors and partners to continue their support that will enable that smooth transition between the peacekeeping and the security agencies.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter Introduction

In June 2016, the GoL took over the security affairs from the UNMIL after thirteen years of peacekeeping operations in Liberia that led to the end of the fifteen years of devastating conflict. The SSR program, which was mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Accord and later reinforced by the Security Council resolution 1509 (2003), had tremendous success over the years. However, the challenges and impediments facing the GoL and the security sector as a whole, can still be seen as peacekeepers prepare to leave Liberia. The civil conflict, which served as the major factor for the implementation and restructuring of the security sector, left scores of major problems that still need to be addressed.

Conclusions

This research made a critical evaluation of the security sector reform in Liberia in an attempt to measure the progress by asking and answering the following supporting secondary questions, which will lead to answering the primary question.

What is the UNMIL framework and timeline for drawdown? The initial UNMIL framework and timeline for drawdown was to take effect in 2012 in line with the Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003). Its mandate was the protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance support, reform of justice and security institutions, human rights promotion, and protection. However, the mandate was extended to June 2016. Currently, UNMIL has a total of 1,500 personnel in Liberia compared to the 15,000 personnel in the initial stage.

What is the status of the security sector in Liberia? The security sector in Liberia is currently faced with financial constraints, lack of equipment and logistics, and a lack of adequate personnel and senior leadership. For instance, the total personnel of the AFL is about 2,000 men, which is insufficient to protect the country.[56]

What are the shortfalls of the security sector in Liberia? The shortfall of the security sector in Liberia is the time constraint to develop top-level leadership and recruitment of more personnel to adequately perform the role of UNMIL before it fully withdraws. Additionally, inadequate funding of the security sector has slow downed the entire process.

Which of the shortfalls is more important? The most significant shortfall is funding for the security sector, which entails recruitment of more personnel, logistic requirements, improving personnel welfare, and sustainment of training.

What can be done to fill these shortfalls? The GoL needs to allocate adequate funding to the security sector, build partnerships with other international state actors for training and support, and grant autonomy to the security sector.

What is the most important thing that the security sector needs to do to maintain peace and stability after UNMIL drawdown? The GoL which controls all the security sectors should be committed in developing the country's political, economic, social, and infrastructural sectors, which will further create the right atmosphere that would sustain the security sector and ensure long-term stability.

[56] Global Security, "Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) / Liberian Army," 2014, accessed 4 April 2017, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/liberia/army.htm.

Recommendations for Decision Makers

This research identified that the GoL still needs to address the gaps and challenges that will enable the security sector to adequately perform its duties in order to assume all responsibilities from UNMIL. Therefore, the following is recommended:

1. The GoL needs to prioritize budget allocation for the security sector, which will enable it to obtain the personnel and logistical requirements needed for the smooth transition process from the UNMIL.
2. GoL needs to pursue strategies to develop its economy to sustain the security sector.
3. The GoL needs to channel more government revenue to improving the infrastructure and social dimensions in Liberia.
4. GoL needs to attract investors into the country, which will help boost the economy and create more job opportunities.

Recommendations for Future Research

In recent years, the impact made by UNMIL led to peace and stability in the war-torn country of Liberia. After thirteen years of peacekeeping in Liberia, UNMIL has started its drawdown in completion of the UN Security Council resolution 1509 (2003). This research evaluated SSR in view of its progress made and challenges ahead of the UNMIL drawdown. With some major gains made in the implementation of the SSR program, the research also identified major gaps and challenges that are facing the GoL and the security sector. The focus in the implementation of the SSR program was fundamentally based on the establishment of the political aspect and the restructuring of the security forces, with less attention on other aspect including economy, information,

social, and infrastructure. As these gaps and challenges remain, impeding factors to the SSR progress, there is the need for a further study on the other dimensions economy, information, social and infrastructure, and how they affect and support the SSR program.

Parting Thoughts

> The successful always has a number of projects planned, to which he looks forward. Anyone of them could change the course of his life overnight.[57]
>
> —Mark Caine

[57] Mark Caine "Mark Caine Quotes," accessed 28 April 2017, http://www.quotes.net/authors/Mark+Caine.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdulai, Jemilatu. “Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Challenges and Lessons Learned.” Academia. 2011. Accessed 13 October 2016. https://www.academia.edu/6245262/Security_Sector_Reform_in_Liberia_Challenges_and_Lessons_Learned.

African Development Bank Group. *Liberia Infrastructure and Inclusive Growth*. Tunisia: Temporary Relocation Agency, 2013. Accessed 18 March 2016. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Liberia_-_Infrastructure_and_Inclusive_Growth_-_Full_Report.pdf.

All Africa. “Liberia: We Are Concern about the Aftermath of UNMIL Drawdown.” Accessed 31 October 2016. http://allafrica.com/stories/201503201684.html.

Amoo, Samuel G. *The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis and Future Perspectives*, Fairfax VA: Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 1992.

Bryden, Alan, Boubacar N’Diaye, and ‘Funmi Olonisakin, eds. *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008. Accessed 15 February 2017. http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/dcaf_bryden_west_africa_security_governance.pdf.

Brzoska, Michael. *Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform: Occasional Paper No. 4*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force, November 2003.

Caine, Mark. “Mark Caine Quotes.” Accessed 28 April 2017. http://www.quotes.net/authors/Mark+Caine.

Carter Center. “Liberia Elections in Brief: Oct. 11 Presidential and Legislative Elections ‘Critical Test’.” 9 October 2011. Accessed 15 February 2017. https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/elections/liberia/in-brief.html.

Carter, J. Burgess. “Over US$104.8M Needed for UNMIL Drawdown.” *Daily Observer*. 2015. Accessed 18 October 2016. http://liberianobserver.com/news-politics/over-us1048m-needed-unmil-drawdown.

Cook, Nicolas. Report no. RL33185, *Liberia’s Post-War Recovery: Key Issues and Developments*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005. Accessed 25 September 2016. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33185.pdf.

de Coning, Cedric, Julian Detzel, and Petter Hojem. *UN Peacekeeping Operations Capstone Doctrine: Report of the TfP Oslo Doctrine Seminar 14 & 15 May 2008, Oslo, Norway*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Accessed 15

February 2017. https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/DPKO%20Capstone%20doctrine%20(2008).pdf.

Fluri, Philipp, and Miroslav Hadžić, ed. *Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform.* Belgrade: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004. Accessed 17 October 2016. http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Sourcebook-on-Security-Sector-Reform.

Genoway, Edwin, Jr. "Liberia: Consistent Threat – Political Parties, Csos Petition UN to Stay." All Africa. 13 March 2016. Accessed 3 March 2017. http://allafrica.com/stories/201603141978.html.

Global Security. "Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) / Liberian Army." 2014. Accessed 4 April 2017. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/liberia/army.htm.

———. "Liberia – First Civil War – 1989-1996." Last modified 11 July 2011. Accessed 17 September 2016. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liberia-1989.htm.

Hendrickson, Dylan. *A Review of Security Sector Reform*. London: Centre for Defence Studies King's College, University of London Strand, September 1999.

Hettinger, Patrick, and Janice Olivia James. "African Economic Outlook: Liberia." Accessed 3 March 2017. http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/country-notes/liberia.

Jallah-Scott, Patricia. ALC Research Report No. 2, "Security Sector Reform and Local Ownership in Liberia." August 2008. Accessed 12 November 2016. http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/alc/publications/ALCReportNo2JallahScott.pdf.

Koenig, Mark. "Celebrating Media's Impact on Development on World Press Freedom Day." 3 May 2012. Accessed 10 March 2017. https://blog.usaid.gov/2012/05/celebrating-medias-impact-on-development-on-world-press-freedom-day-2/.

Kuhlmann, Jurgen, and Jean Callaghan. *Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2000.

Kulah, Arthur. *Liberia Will Rise Again: Reflections on the Liberian Civil Crisis*. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1999.

Landgren, Karin. "The Drawdown of the UN Mission in Liberia Resumes." *Huffington Post*, 29 June 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/karin-landgren/the-drawdown-of-the-un-mi_b_7126020.html.

Lazuta, Jennifer. “UN Takes Next Steps in Drawdown of Military Presence in Liberia.” *Voice of America News*. 15 January 2013. Accessed 17 October 2016. http://www.voanews.com/a/un-military-drawdown-in-liberia/1584118.html.

Liberia Public Expenditure Review Note. “Meeting the Challenges of the UNMIL Security Transition.” Report No. 71009-LR.2013. Accessed 4 February 2016. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/524941468055756666/pdf/710090ESW0P1270C0disclosed030130130.pdf.

Malan, Mark. *Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US War College, March 2008. Accessed 18 October 2016. http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/.

Meharg Sarah, and Arnusch Aleisha, *Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2010.

Nikolaisen, Trine. “Decentralizing Liberia’s Security Sector: The Role of Non-Governmental Actors in Justice and Security Delivery.” *Conflict Trends* 3 (2013): 50-56. Accessed 12 December 2016. http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/40524/611707/file/Decentralising-Liberia’sSecurity-Sector.pdf.

Nyei, Ibrahim Al-Bakri. “Post-War Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Development and Challenge.” *Conflict Trends* no. 1 (January 2010): 46-54.

Omotola, J. Shola. “Beyond Transition: Challenges of Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction in Liberia” *Journal of Security Sector Management* 4, no. 4 (November 2006): 2-5.

Podder, Sukanya. “Bridging the ‘Conceptual–Contextual’ Divide: Security Sector Reform in Liberia and UNMIL Transition.” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 7, no. 3 (13 March 2013): 353-380. Accessed 19 October 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2013.770242.

Robinson, Karen Barnes, and Craig Valters, with Tove Strauss and Aaron Weah. “Progress in Small Steps Security against the Odds in Liberia.” Overseas Development Institute. January 2015. Accessed 4 March 2017. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9420.pdf.

Security Sector Reform Resource Center. “SSR Country Snapshot: Liberia.” Centre for Security Governance. 23 June 2014. www.ssrresourcecentre.org/countries/ssr-country-snapshot-liberia.

Silalahi, Ingrid, and Bora Kamwanya. “Liberia – UNMIL. Toward the completion of the security transition.” *Institute for Peace in Partnership* (25 March 2016): 2-5. Accessed 17 October 2016. https://ippjournal.wordpress.com/2016/03/25/liberia-unmil-toward-the-completion-of-the-security-transition/.

Sungbeh, Tewroh-Wehtoe. “Liberian Government Must Invest in Infrastructure Projects to Create Jobs and Give Country Major Facelift.” The Liberian Dialogue. 7 December 2016. http://theliberiandialogue.org/2016/12/07/liberian-government-must-invest-in-infrastructure-projects-to-create-jobs-and-give-country-major-facelift/.

Tiepoh, Geepu-Nah. “The Liberian Economy: The Path from Loot to Development (Part I).” The Perspective. Accessed 3 March 2017. http://theperspective.org/economy1.html.

United Nations. “Security Council Authorizes Resumed Drawdown of United Nations Mission in Liberia, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2215 (2015).” Accessed 2 April 2017. http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11849.doc.htm.

———. “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, Capstone Doctrine Draft 3, UN DPKO, 29 June 2007.” Accessed 15 November 2016. https://issuu.com/uniccanberra/docs/capstone_doctrine_eng

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). “Background.” 13 April 2013. Accessed 25 September 2016. http://unmil.unmissions.org/background.

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1509. 2003. Accessed 23 October 2016 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1509 (2003).

———. Resolution 2215. 2015. Accessed 15 February 2017. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2215(2015).

United States Institute of Peace. “Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” 18 August 2003. Accessed 15 February 2017. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf.

US Agency for International Development, US Department of Defense and US Department of State. Security Sector Reform 7 – State, “*Security Sector Reform*.” February 2009. Accessed 1 November 2016. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf.

US Army. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5.0, *The Operations Process*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012.

World Bank Group. “Liberia Poverty Note: Tracking the Dimensions of Poverty.” Accessed 5 March 2017. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/12320